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TWO CONCEPTIONS OF TORT DAMAGES:
FAIR V. FULL COMPENSATION
John C. P. Goldberg*
INTRODUCTION
A conference devoted to the subject of noneconomic damages in-
vites us to consider the broader question of what, in principle, a dam-
ages award in a tort case is meant to accomplish.' On its face, that
question seems easily answered. The point of tort damages is to com-
pensate, to restore the status quo ante, to make the plaintiff whole.
Among modern torts scholars, these stock phrases tend to be under-
stood as different ways of saying that the immediate purpose of a tort
suit is to compensate the victim with an amount of money equal to the
losses suffered because of the tort. The Harper and James treatise
nicely conveys this point: "The cardinal principle of damages in An-
glo-American law is that of compensation for the injury caused to the
plaintiff by defendant's breach of duty" where compensation consists
of "repairing plaintiff's injury or ... making him whole as nearly as
that may be done by an award of money."'2
* Associate Dean for Research and Professor, Vanderbilt Law School. Thanks to Anita
Bernstein, Jim Ely, Julie Faber, Richard Nagareda, Tony Sebok, Michael Stein, and Ben Zipur-
sky for helpful comments, and to Isaac Combs for valuable research assistance.
1. The following analysis operates at a high level of generality and is subject to numerous
qualifications. For now, I leave aside, among other topics, awards of nominal damages and in-
junctive relief; the role of comparative fault and failure to mitigate in reducing damages; the
theoretical question of the incommensurability of money and certain losses; practical problems
of computation; the effect on the plaintiff's recovery of U.S. common law's refusal to embrace
the "loser pays" rule; the roles played by first-party and liability insurance; and issues pertaining
to collection, bankruptcy, and the like.
2. 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 490, 493 (2d ed. 1986) (internal
citations omitted); see also MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 2 (7th ed. 2001) ("[T]he fundamental issue addressed by a system of tort liabil-
ity for unintended injury is when losses should be shifted from an injury victim to an injurer or
some other source of compensation"); CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS
ON TORTS § 3, at 7 (2d ed. 1980) ("The central problem in most tort cases is: whether the plaintiff
or the defendant should bear a loss."); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, The Law, and the Personal
Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 160 (1958) (noting in passing that "the function of
tort damages [is] to make the plaintiff whole"); Clarence Morris, Rough Justice and Some Uto-
pian Ideas, 24 ILL. L. REV. 730, 732 (1929-30) (arguing that, relative to the interests of the
plaintiff, tort law substitutes for vengeance an insurance payment by which "[t]he exact sum of
the plaintiff's loss is charged to the defendant"). The Second Torts Restatement states that the
proper measure of tort damages must be derived from the "purposes for which actions of tort
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This essay aims to complicate our thinking about the linkage be-
tween tort law and the idea of making whole. It suggests, first, that
standard modern accounts that draw this link collapse an important
distinction between (on the one hand) the immediate reasons for
which the law provides a tort victim with a right of action against a
tortfeasor and (on the other hand) the proper description of the rem-
edy to which a person who successfully prosecutes a tort action is enti-
tled.3 Typically, the law makes tort causes of action available in order
to enable someone who has suffered a certain type of wrong at the
hands of another to vindicate his or her interests as against the wrong-
doer by empowering him or her to proceed against the wrongdoer
through the legal system. The animating ideas here are relational and
retaliatory, involving notions of empowerment, response, and satisfac-
tion. As such, they stand in contrast to standard renditions of the
make-whole notion, which treat tort law as a means by which a person
who suffers a harm can have that harm annulled, erased, or
indemnified.
Second, this essay suggests that by attending to the foregoing dis-
tinction, we can better appreciate why the notion of making whole-
fully indemnifying the victim for his or her losses-seems to provide a
plausible description of the proper measure of tort damages, yet in the
end fails to do so. In personal injury cases, tort damages-as opposed
to tort causes of action-are properly conceptualized at least in part in
terms of a backward-looking notion of restoration, as opposed to a
forward-looking idea of the sort embodied in contractual expectation
damages. In other words, tort law typically does draw some link be-
actions are maintainable," and treats the giving of "compensation, indemnity or restitution for
harms" as the first and primary purpose of tort. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a), at
451 (1979).
Of course, many believe that the compensatory function of tort enables it to serve some addi-
tional or alternative function(s) of equal or greater social importance, such as loss-spreading
(e.g., Fleming James, Roger Traynor) or deterrence of antisocial conduct (e.g., John Austin,
Richard Posner).
3. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 748-49
(2003) (emphasizing the importance of distinguishing the question of whether a claimant is enti-
tled to an avenue of recourse against defendant from the question of the nature of the remedy to
which a plaintiff is entitled).
It will aid the cause of analysis to be as clear on terminology as possible. I use the plural word
"damages" to refer to the monetary payment that a person or entity is obligated to pay to a
victim who successfully prosecutes a civil action against that person or entity. I will use the
terms "harm," "loss," and "damage"-the latter in the singular only-to refer to setbacks or
adverse effects that a person might suffer, whether as the result of wrongful conduct or other
causes. These effects include bodily harms (including death), harm to tangible property, out-of-
pocket expenditures, loss of present and future wealth, loss of reputation, loss of privacy, pain
and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life.
436 [Vol. 55:435
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tween the way in which things have gone worse for the victim and the
quantum or degree of satisfaction that he or she may obtain via a tort
action. Moreover, it often authorizes the factfinder to award full in-
demnification as the measure of satisfaction to which a given tort vic-
tim is entitled. Yet to acknowledge these points is still not to say that a
successful claimant is entitled to receive, and may only receive, an
award of damages that fully indemnifies him or her. Many tort victims
are neither entitled to nor limited to this measure of damages, and
many appropriately obtain a remedy in the form of less-than-full com-
pensation or more-than-full compensation.
To render these abstract and contrarian thoughts clearer and more
concrete, I will turn to history. Specifically, I will offer evidence sug-
gesting that, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Anglo-Amer-
ican jurists appreciated and accepted the foregoing points. I will also
provide evidence indicating that the tight linkage of tort to the idea of
making-whole did not emerge until the mid- to late nineteenth cen-
tury. As it turns out, a handy way to capture the difference between
the older and the newer view, and to help explain how the latter
emerged from the former, is to focus on a longstanding and crucial
ambiguity in the legal term "injury." In one standard usage, the term
refers to a completed wrong that has been committed by one person
against another. In another usage, it refers to a loss or setback that a
person has suffered. 4 An understanding of torts as a law of injury,
where injury is used in the first sense above, depicts tort as a law for
the redress of wrongs, which in turn supports a conception of tort
damages as fair compensation.5 The idea of fair compensation in turn
requires of the fact-finder an overtly normative determination based
on consideration not only of the losses suffered by the victim, but also
of the character of the defendant's conduct, mitigating circumstances
that do not rise to the level of recognized defenses, and the power
dynamic between the parties. 6 By contrast, an understanding of tort
as a law of injury, where injury is meant in the second sense above,
4. The Oxford English Dictionary's first definition of the noun "injury" is "[w]rongful action
or treatment; violation or infringement of another's rights," whereas its third definition is
"[blurt or loss caused to or sustained by a person or thing; harm, detriment, damage." OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), http://dictionary.oed.comcgi/findword?query-type=word&
queryword=injury.
5. In using the term "fair" I do not mean to invoke or rely on a Kantian or Rawlsian theory of
justice. Rather, I use it to convey the commonsense idea of an outcome that is appropriate in
the sense of being equitable or reasonable.
6. As this Introduction emphasizes, the historical and theoretical account of tort and tort dam-
ages on offer here does not stand in polar opposition to the standard account-it does not define
the victim's entitlement to redress in a way that renders the value of the losses suffered by a tort
victim irrelevant. Still, because it does not treat the idea of full compensation as defining the
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depicts tort as a law of indemnification, which in turn supports a con-
ception of tort damages as full compensation, which requires the
factfinder to set damages at an amount equal to the losses suffered by
the tort victim as a result of the tort.
Part II argues that a conception of tort law built around injury-as-
wronging prevails in works such as Blackstone's Commentaries, Ba-
con's Abridgement, and some influential early American treatises, in-
cluding those of Dane and Swift. It further argues that these sources
embraced the idea of fair compensation as part of a wrongs-and-re-
dress conception of tort law. Part III then discusses a handful of early
nineteenth-century state court decisions, particularly a line of deci-
sions from Pennsylvania, that shed light on how the indemnification
model of tort law, and the full compensation conception of damages,
began to take root in the first half of the nineteenth century. I also
discuss some early treatments of punitive damages that replay and fur-
ther illuminate the division between the two conceptions of tort dam-
ages. In doing so, I argue that scholars who have previously addressed
the now famous Sedgwick-Greenleaf debate over the propriety of pu-
nitive damages have misunderstood the position that Greenleaf
adopted. In Part IV, I offer some speculative explanations for the rise
to prominence in modern treatises and law review articles of the
make-whole conception of tort by linking the doctrinal developments
discussed in Part III to broader trends in nineteenth-century legal the-
ory. I conclude by identifying some present-day implications of the
choice between the fair compensation and the full compensation con-
ceptions of tort damages.
II. INJURY AS WRONG, DAMAGES AS REDRESS (FAIR
COMPENSATION)
As we trace our steps backward in time, the fog of ignorance inevi-
tably grows denser. Yet we can readily locate evidence indicating the
absence of a linkage of tort law to the modern idea of making whole.
Exhibit number one is Blackstone's Commentaries. Whatever one
thinks of the merits or politics of this work, nobody seems to dispute
its influence on English and early American law. 7 So we may assume
that the presentation by Blackstone of a conception of tort that does
not link it to the idea of loss-shifting or full compensation reveals a
common way in which many late eighteenth-century courts and law-
redress to which a successful tort plaintiff is entitled, it differs conceptually from the standard
modern view and has different practical entailments, as discussed below.
7. See John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right
to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 560 n.176 (2005).
[Vol. 55:435
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yers were thinking about those subjects. As we will see, this assump-
tion is borne out by American treatises.
I have elsewhere described in some detail Blackstone's thinking
about law and about tort.8 The gist is as follows: the Commentaries
draw a roughly Hartian distinction between two broad types of laws:
laws that confer powers and laws that articulate obligations. The first
type is covered in Books I and II, respectively titled "The Rights of
Persons" and "The Rights of Things."9 The second type of law, ad-
dressed in Books III and IV (respectively titled "Private Wrongs" and
"Public Wrongs") prohibits certain forms of conduct and provides
remedies or sanctions for violations of these prohibitions. 10 A public
wrong is a crime, defined as "a breach and violation of public rights
and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a com-
munity .... " 1 A private wrong is conduct that involves "an infringe-
ment or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals,
considered as individuals .... ,,12 Whereas private wrongs generate a
claim on behalf of the victim against the wrongdoer to redress the
wrong done to him or her, public wrongs generate a power in the state
to punish the wrongdoer for the common good.
Breaches of contract, nonrepayments of debts, and acts of waste
committed by tenants were all deemed by Blackstone to be private
wrongs. 13 So, too, were tortious acts such as assault, battery, conver-
sion, false imprisonment, malpractice, negligence, and trespass to
land.'4 Each of these torts identified a set of duties owed by an actor
to another person (or classes of other persons) that required him or
her to act (or refrain from acting) in specified ways toward that other
(those others) so as to avoid interfering with his or her (their) rights.
Thus, a breach of any of these duties constituted a deprivation of the
victim's rights. The linkage of the tortfeasor's commission of a private
wrong to the deprivation of the victim's right is evident in Black-
stone's use of the phrase "civil injury" as a synonym for private
wrong.15 In this phrase, the word "injury" refers to a doing, as op-
posed to a result or outcome. To suffer an injury is to suffer a depri-
vation of one's rights at the hands of another. This usage follows in a
literal way the Latin injuria, which combines the prefix "in," meaning
8. Id. at 545-59.
9. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *117; 2 id. at *1.
10. 3 id. at *1; 4 id. at *1.
11. 3 id. at *2.
12. Id.
13. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *116-18.
14. Id. at *120, *122, *127, *208.
15. Id. at *2.
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"negation," with the noun "juria," meaning "right." 16 Grasping this
understanding of injury explains the intelligibility of the familiar
maxim damnum absque injuria.t 7 In cases to which this maxim ap-
plied, a victim suffered a bad outcome, but not by virtue of the sort of
mistreatment that qualified as a rights-deprivation or wrong. 18
So tort law was, in Blackstone's view, law that articulated a cluster
of private wrongs. Of course, it was also law that provided a set of
remedies appropriate to these wrongs. In some instances, it privileged
the victim to respond directly (e.g., by acting in self-defense, or by
peacefully repossessing property). More commonly, it empowered
the victim to commence a cause of action in the common-law courts.
The most important of these were the "personal" actions, which corre-
spond to what we would today call actions sounding in tort and con-
tract. Although personal actions occasionally enabled a victim to
obtain a literal restoration of his or her rights (as would an action for
what we now call specific performance), 19 they usually offered instead
the substitute remedy of "a pecuniary satisfaction in damages. ' 20
That Blackstone framed tort redress in terms of pecuniary satisfac-
tion through law in lieu of self-help or a literal restoration of one's
rights offers an important insight into his conception of torts as private
wrongs. By entering into civil society, he supposed, each individual
cedes his or her right to retaliate against someone who has deprived
that individual of his or her rights to life, liberty, or property owner-
16. Although injury today is more commonly used to describe an effect rather than a doing, it
still carries with it a normative connotation largely missing from more straight-forwardly factual
notions of harm or loss. Specifically, it is used to refer to a set of individual interests that the law
recognizes as worthy of protection and vindication. For example, even though interference with
one's interest in being free from annoyance-or in having aesthetically pleasing surroundings-
might fairly be treated as a setback or harm to the victim, neither is treated by tort law as a
sufficiently weighty interest to warrant recognition of duties on the part of others to refrain from
or avoid interfering with that interest. If D acts carelessly with regard to P's interest in not being
annoyed so as proximately to cause P annoyance, P has no tort cause of action against D be-
cause the law of negligence does not regard the suffering of annoyance as the sort of harm that
rises to the level of an injury, even though the annoyance is a loss or harm suffered by P. JOHN
C. P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 48-49 (2004).
17. Black's Law Dictionary defines damnum absque injuria as "[l]oss, hurt, or harm without
injury in the legal sense, that is, without such breach of duty as is redressible by an action."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 470 (4th ed. 1968).
18. The adjective "civil" in turn indicated that the rights-deprivation was legally cognizable, as
opposed to a mere moral wrong, and that it was a wrong to the victim regardless of whether it
was a crime (i.e., a wrong to the public).
19. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *7 (stating that personal actions "redress the party in-
jured, by either restoring to him his right, if possible; or by giving him an equivalent") (emphasis
added).
20. 3 id. at *116-17.
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ship.2' Understandably, government generally declines to restore that
right in the form of a broad, positive-law self-help privilege.2 2 Instead,
the victim is offered the alternative of obtaining satisfaction through
an action at law, usually for damages. That the law of private wrongs
was offered in recognition of the victim's right to respond to mistreat-
ment at the hands of another explains why that law generates an ex-
clusive power in the victim to seek redress through law. No one other
than the victim (or his or her representative), not even the King, could
decide to commence or withdraw a personal action.2 3
In sum, according to Blackstone, the commission of a tort was dis-
tinguished from the commission of a crime by the type of duty at issue
and, correspondingly, the type of response that the law authorized.
As public wrongs, crimes involved breaches of duty owed to no one in
particular, or to the state, or to the community at large. When they
were committed, the appropriate response was punishment for the
public good, and the appropriate responder was the state (or, less
anachronistically, the individual on behalf of the state).2 4 As private
wrongs, torts involved a failure to heed duties of noninjury owed by
actors to particular persons or classes of persons. When these sorts of
breaches were committed, the law responded by empowering the vic-
tim to sue to obtain redress from the injurer, usually in the form of a
court-ordered damages payment.
Given this understanding of the point of actions for private wrongs,
it is perhaps not surprising to find that Blackstone's discussions of "re-
dress" and "satisfaction" do not focus on ideas such as indemnifica-
tion or compensation. Indeed, so far as I am aware, he never uses
phrases such as "make whole" or "making whole. '25 In a personal
action, he says, the jury is to award damages adequate to provide sat-
21. 2 id. at *438 (discussing how law channels the natural right to seek satisfaction from a
wrongdoer).
22. Among other things, declining to do so discourages continuing cycles of vengeance, pro-
tects wrongdoers from excessive retaliation, and empowers victims who might otherwise be una-
ble to retaliate.
23. Goldberg, supra note 7, at 555 n.153.
24. In Blackstone's time, criminal actions tended to be prosecuted by victims rather than pro-
fessional prosecutors. Still, when acting in this capacity, the victim proceeded on behalf of the
state, rather than himself. Royal officials could thus terminate the prosecution or pardon the
offense at their discretion. By contrast, private actions were brought by victims on behalf of
themselves and were controlled by them. Thus, even when the English monarch enjoyed the so-
called "dispensing" power, he could not invoke it (or the power of pardon) to protect a
tortfeasor from being exposed to a private suit brought by the victim. Id.
25. Thanks to electronic databases, the Commentaries are now searchable. To check my im-
pression, I pulled up the fifteenth edition of the Commentaries (which includes all the revisions
to the book that Blackstone made in his lifetime) on the Thomson Gale database. See Gale.com,
The Making of Modern Law: Legal Treatises 1800-1926, http://www.gale.com/ModernLaw (last
2006]
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isfaction. 26 Likewise, he speaks of the plaintiff's right to recover
"damages for the injury sustained. '27 Here it must again be stressed
that, when Blackstone speaks of a successful claimant recovering dam-
ages for an injury, he does not mean that the claimant is entitled to an
amount of money equal to the quantum of loss suffered. Instead, the
money awarded should suffice to provide satisfaction for the victimi-
zation, including not only the harm caused to the victim, but also the
objective fact of having been mistreated by another.28 Support for
this reading comes from Blackstone's observation that claims for par-
ticularly heinous or willful wrongs may subject the tortfeasor to a stat-
utory multiplier or "very large and exemplary damages. ' 29 Nowhere
does he suggest that these exemplary damages are different in kind
from "ordinary" damage awards, or that they are awarded for public
rather than private purposes. Quite the opposite, they form part of
the redress to which the victim is entitled because of the nature of the
tortfeasor's mistreatment of the victim. 30
Even when Blackstone does invoke the concept of "damages" to
refer to the quantum of harm suffered by the plaintiff, he is careful to
distinguish that usage from the distinct use of "damages" to refer to
the amount that the successful personal injury plaintiff is entitled to
obtain. Discussing writs of inquiry, he takes care to note that, while
the jurors' verdict "must assess some damages," it may assess them
"to what amount they please."' 31 It is difficult to see why he would
visited Nov. 29, 2005). For each of the book's four volumes, I entered the queries "make w3
whole" and "making w3 whole." There were no relevant hits for either search.
26. See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *128 (noting that the tort remedy for false im-
prisonment aims at "making satisfaction for it") (emphasis omitted).
27. Id. at *124 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
28. Id. at *125 (describing a slander by means of a truthful statement as falling within the
damnum absque injuria maxim; the slander may have harmed the plaintiff's reputation, but its
truth rendered it privileged, and therefore its utterance was not an "injuring" of the plaintiff).
29. See id. at *121 (treble damages); id. at *139-40 (observing that, because of the gravity of
the wrong of adultery, a husband may obtain from an adulterer a "satisfaction" via a trespass
action "wherein the damages recovered are usually very large and exemplary," although appro-
priately adjusted by "circumstances [including] the rank and fortune of the plaintiff and defen-
dant; the relation or connexion between them; the seduction or otherwise of the wife, founded
on her previous behaviour and character; and the husband's obligation . .. to provide for those
children, which he cannot but suspect to be spurious"); 3 id. at *220 (noting the likelihood that
"very exemplary damages" will be given to the victim of a repeated nuisance). Obviously, statu-
tory damage multipliers multiply something, namely the initial damage award. But the damage
award was not in the first instance keyed to making whole. It was just the number that the jury
came up with based on its all-things-considered assessment.
30. I briefly discuss below how punitive damages figure in the two conceptions of tort dam-
ages. See infra text accompanying notes 86-108.
31. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *397-98. A writ of inquiry was a court order that fol-
lowed the entry of certain kinds of interlocutory judgments, particularly default judgments. Such
writs directed a sheriff to empanel a jury to determine the damages the plaintiff had sustained.
[Vol. 55:435
2006] TWO CONCEPTIONS OF TORT DAMAGES
attribute to jurors a discretion of this breadth if their verdicts were
subject to a rule of law specifying that the successful plaintiff is enti-
tled to damages equal in amount to the losses he or she sustained.
Instead, Blackstone seems to have supposed that victims who could
not literally be restored to their rights were entitled to the sum of
money that a jury, proceeding in good faith, determined to be appro-
priate in light of both the nature of the mistreatment and its conse-
quences for the plaintiff. It is true that judges of Blackstone's time
were entitled to order new trials on the ground of "exorbitant dam-
ages."'32 But he does not describe this power as it is sometimes de-
scribed today-as an opportunity for a judge to ask whether the jury
has made a gross valuation error. Instead, he maintains that the
power is properly invoked only if a given damages award is so exorbi-
tant as to provide evidence of a failure of process in the form of cor-
ruption or prejudice on the part of the jurors.33 Thus, he reasons that
if, upon a new trial, a second jury were to return a similar verdict to
the first, the judge reviewing the second verdict should not order a
third trial because even if a third trial were to result in a lower verdict,
it would be difficult to see why the third jury-the outlier in the sam-
ple of three-should be credited as the noncorrupt one.34
The foregoing analysis suffices, I think, to demonstrate that the
model of tort damages contained in Blackstone's Commentaries was
not the full-compensation, make-whole model of today. In his view,
the rule for calculating damages, at least for actions seeking satisfac-
tion for the deprivations of rights such as the right to bodily integrity
or reputation, was a rule calling for an award that reflects the wrong
done to the victim by the injurer. He may, however, have held a dif-
ferent view of damages awards for torts involving harm to property, as
well as breaches of contract-one that treated full compensation as a
default measure of damages. As in all personal actions for damages, it
Id. at *398. The above discussion may help explain a related passage, in which Blackstone states
that jurors who return a verdict indicating that they have found for the plaintiff are to "assess the
damages also sustained by the plaintiff, in consequence of the injury" perpetrated against him by
the defendant. Id. at *377. Here the seemingly awkward use of the word "also" can be ex-
plained as indicating that the jurors' award of damages to the plaintiff should take into account
both the nature of the wronging of the plaintiff by the defendant and the quantum of harm the
plaintiff suffered because of the wronging.
32. Id. at *387. Courts could not order new trials on the ground that the jury's damages award
was too low, although some apparently did issue new writs of inquiry on that basis. See JOSEPH
SAYER, THE LAW OF DAMAGES 197-98, 205-09 (1770), available at Gale.com, Eighteenth Cen-
tury Collections Online, http://gale.com/EighteenthCentury.
33. Id.
34. Id. For a discussion of the significance of English common-law practice for modern day
new-trial practice, see Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under
the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 769-82 (2003).
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was the jury's job in these cases to assess damages. But, in discussing
them, Blackstone tends not to describe that job in terms of the free-
wheeling inquiry outlined above. For example, in one place he sug-
gests that an ordinary action for conversion (such as a conversion
without malice) entails that "the plaintiff shall recover damages, equal
to the value of the thing converted .... -35 He expresses similar views
with regard to awards of damages in actions for breach of contract, as
well as actions for restitution.36 Yet even in these categories of cases,
the diminished value of the property, or the value of the performance
withheld, is treated as establishing a guideline. If, for example, the
defendant's interference with the plaintiff's property was willful or
malicious, it was clearly within the province of the jury to award dam-
ages that exceeded the value of the harm to the property. Again,
these broader awards were not styled as "punitive" or "extra-compen-
satory" damages, but rather as part of the redress to which a claimant
was entitled by virtue of the fact that the defendant had deprived the
claimant of his right through conduct that constituted egregious
mistreatment.
To the extent it is tempting to dismiss Blackstone's views as "for-
eign," there is in fact good reason to think that his conception of tort
falls under the heading of private wrongs, and the view of damages
that flowed from that conception made its way across the Atlantic. As
noted above, the influence of the Commentaries on early American
law seems undisputed.37 More to the point, two early American com-
mentators-Nathan Dane and Zephaniah Swift-explicitly adopt his
approach to tort law and damages. Thus, each employs the distinction
between public and private wrongs and each includes within the do-
main of private wrongs "personal" actions to obtain damages for
rights that cannot be restored. The latter are in turn divided into ac-
tions sounding in assumpsit (promise) and actions sounding in tort or
35. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *152. It is notable that one of the few instances, if not the
only instance, in which Blackstone links the idea of injury to notions of loss and indemnification
is in stating the principle that, when Parliament seizes private property for public use, it must
provide "full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained." 1 id. at *135.
Here the forced alienation of the citizen's property, albeit justified by something akin to public
necessity, counts as an injuring of the property owner. Instances of this special class of injury
will by definition lack any indicia of egregiousness, and will always concern only interference
with property ownership. Hence relief for the owner is set, as a matter of law, at the value of the
property.
36. Id. at *157 (stating that a disappointed promisee is entitled to a contract damages award
equal to the loss sustained as a result of the breach); id. at *161 (explaining that quantum meruit
plaintiff is entitled the jury's estimate of the value of his efforts on behalf of the recipient of
those efforts).
37. See supra note 7.
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wrongs. 38 (The catalogue of wrongs includes the familiar collection of
nominate torts, as well as more extended discussions of the emerging
tort of negligence than one finds in Blackstone.) And the gist of these
actions is defined in Blackstonian terms. Thus, according to Swift, a
private wrong amounts to the infringement of the victim's rights and
therefore a suit for the redress of such a wrong is a prosecution "for
the recovery of one's right."'39 To effect such recovery, this part of the
law operates "by compelling the wrong doer to give some thing to the
injured party, by way of amends and satisfaction. '40
Likewise, as to the computation of damages, both Dane and Swift
insisted that juries have discretion to award damages by reference not
only to the loss sustained by the plaintiff, but also to the nature of the
defendant's wrongdoing. Dane, for example, points to a case of mali-
cious prosecution stating that "the jury may consider the malice, and
give the plaintiff more in damages than the expenses he was put to,
where he sustained no injury in his trade or reputation. ' 41 Later, he
asserted that juries have broad discretion, not cabined by "any rule of
computation," in determining the amount of damages in "nearly...
all cases of torts and many in contracts." 42 For his part, Swift stated
that "[i]n an action of trespass, the jury are not confined to the actual
damages sustained but may consider the malicious intent of the defen-
dant .... -"43 Today, of course, we might be tempted to treat this sort
of statement as supporting the idea that, for certain egregious, tortious
conduct, a plaintiff is entitled to ask for punitive damages. But, as was
the case with Blackstone, there is no suggestion that Dane or Swift
regarded the added increment of damages as a separate category or
kind of damage. Rather, each treated the jury as having discretion to
set damages in a holistic manner that promises the plaintiff "satisfac-
tion" in light of the nature of his mistreatment at the hands of the
defendant, as well as the extent of any losses resulting from that
mistreatment.
In reviewing the foregoing works, I do not mean to suggest that
lawyers and commentators were fastidious in their use of the concept
38. 2 NATHAN DANE, GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW, art. 1,
§§ 2-3, at 481-82 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1823); 1 HENRY DUTrON, A REVISION OF
SwiFr's DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF CONNECTICUT 481 (1851). Swift's book was originally pub-
lished in 1823. Both are available at Gale.com, The Making of Modern Law: Legal Treatises
1800-1926, http://www.gale.com/ModernLaw.
39. 1 DUTTON, supra note 38, at 481.
40. Id.
41. 2 DANE, supra note 38, at art. 8, § 12, at 735.
42. 3 id. § 1, at 349.
43. 1 DUTrON, supra note 38, at 679.
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of injury, such that they never invoked it to refer to loss, and hence
never flirted with an indemnification conception of tort damages. Evi-
dence to the contrary can be found, for example, in Bacon's New
Abridgement of the Law, initially published between 1736 and 1766.44
Most of Bacon's usage comports with Blackstonian usage. Damages
recoverable in personal actions, for example, are said to be "a Com-
pensation given by the Jury for an Injury or a Wrong done the party
•.. before the Action brought. '45 Likewise, Bacon introduced his dis-
cussion of actions under the writ of trespass as follows:
The Word Trespass, which is derived from the Latin word Trans-
gredior, signifies a going beyond what is lawful. It follows, that
every injurious Act is, in the large sense of the Word, a Trespass.
But, as many injurious Acts are distinguished by particular Names,
as Treason, Murder, Rape, and other Names, the legal Sense of the
Word Trespass is confined to such injurious Acts as have not ac-
quired a particular Name.46
The use of the phrase "it follows" to start the second sentence, in light
of the content of the first sentence, strongly suggests that "injurious"
should be understood to mean wrongful, as opposed to harmful. As
to damages, Bacon was also prepared to confer on juries broad discre-
tion to do justice:
In all Actions which sound in Damages, the Jury seem to have a
discretionary Power of giving what Damages they think proper; for
tho' in Contracts the very Sum specified and agreed on is usually
given, yet, if there are any Circumstances of Hardship, Fraud, or
Deceit, tho' not sufficient to invalidate the Contract, the Jury may
consider of them, and proportion and mitigate the Damages
accordingly . . .47
44. See MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW (1736), available at Gale.com,
Eighteenth Century Collections Online, http://gale.com/EighteenthCentury. Although perhaps
not on par with the Commentaries in terms of their stature, Bacon's Abridgment figured promi-
nently in early American law and legal education. George Wyeth, for example, relied on it as
the basis for his law lectures at William and Mary. Craig Evan Klafter, The Influence of Voca-
tional Law Schools on the Origins of American Legal Thought, 1779-1829, 37 AM. J. LEGAL
HIsT. 307, 315 (1993).
45. 2 BACON, supra note 44, at 1 (1736).
46. 5 id. at 150 (1766) (paragraph breaks omitted). In later editions, this text was revised in a
way to tighten the linkage of injuriousness and wronging:
The Word Trespass is derived from the French word Trespasser, which signifies to go
beyond what is right. It follows, that every injurious Act is in the large sense of the
Word a Trespass. But as divers injurious Acts are called Felonies, and are distinguished
by particular Names, as Treason, Murder, &c. the word Trespass does not, in the legal
Sense thereof, extend to any such injurious Acts.
Id. at 157 (emphasis added) (paragraph breaks omitted).
47. 2 id. at 4.
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A later passage, however, may indicate some slippage toward the
notion of injury as loss. In discussing an action for battery brought
under the writ of trespass, Bacon stated that "[i]f one Man receives
any corporal Injury from the voluntary Act of another, an Action of
Trespass Vi et Armis does sometimes lie; although there was no De-
sign to hurt .... -48 While it is possible to read the word "injury" in
the phrase "corporal injury" to mean "wrong"-a wrong involving
bodily harm-it seems more natural to treat "injury" in this instance
as referring to the harmful consequence suffered as a result of a
wrong, rather than the wrong itself. In any event, even if the author
intended "injury" to mean "wrong," the text demonstrates how easy it
would be for inattentive readers, writers, or speakers to slide from a
notion of injury as wrong to a notion of injury as loss. As it turns out,
this potential for slippage was promptly realized in early American
case law.
III. INJURIES AS LOSSES, DAMAGES AS INDEMNIFICATION (FULL
COMPENSATION)
In Part II, I demonstrated that Blackstone's influential late eight-
eenth-century account of tort law was rooted in the idea of injury,
understood to mean a wrongful treatment of one person by another.
In turn, this account supported a fair compensation conception of
damages. In this Part, I will review early American decisions that pro-
vide evidence of a shift in judicial treatment of tort damages from the
fair compensation toward the full compensation conception; a shift
that in turn would eventually help provoke a fundamental change in
standard conceptions of the nature and purposes of tort law.
A. Doctrinal Markers on the Road to Making Whole
A line of decisions issued by the Pennsylvania courts suggests that
an alternative conception of both tort law and tort damages was
emerging in the early years of the nineteenth century. We begin with
a pair of decisions that were decided in 1786 and 1800, respectively.
In the first, Purviance v. Angus, the Pennsylvania High Court of Er-
rors reviewed an admiralty court's decision rejecting a claim for in-
demnification brought by the owners of a ship against the master
48. 5 id. at 162. As an aside, it is perhaps worth noting that even in 1766, Bacon's treatise
states that liability for Trespass is not strict, but must be imputed to "Negligence" or "Default"
on the part of the injurer. Id.
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whom they had employed to pilot it.49 Because of the master's partici-
pation in the wrongful seizure of another ship, the owners had in-
curred (through the operation of respondeat superior) a liability to the
seized ship's owners in the amount of about £3,800.50 They then
sought reimbursement from the master for this liability on the ground
that it was the master's doing that caused the liability. The admiralty
court dismissed the claim, but a divided high court reversed, imposing
on the master an obligation to reimburse his employers in the full
amount, again nearly £3,800.51
Counsel for the master moved for rehearing, which prompted Jus-
tice Shippen to invite his colleagues to consider the question of
whether they were "bound to estimate the [owners'] damages by the
real loss, or whether [they] may not mitigate them, according to the
circumstances and degree of negligence in the [master]. ' 52 In ex-
tending this invitation, Shippen cited Russell v. Palmer,53 an English
decision arising out of a tort action for legal malpractice, in which the
client claimed that his lawyer's negligence left him unable to collect
from a third party a £3,000 debt. Although the trial judge in Russell
had instructed the jury that if they found for the client on the merits
they were required to award him the full value of the debt, that in-
struction was later deemed erroneous because for an "action sounding
merely in damages, the Jury ought to have been left at liberty to find
what damages they thought fit."' 54 On retrial, the Russell jury awarded
the lesser amount of £500 because of "favorable circumstances ap-
pearing for the Defendant .. . . -55 Apparently persuaded by Ship-
pen's invocation of Russell, the Pennsylvania Court in Purviance
proceeded to reduce the amount that the master owed to his employ-
ers by approximately two-thirds. 56
Fourteen years later, Justice Shippen and his colleagues seemed to
change their tune. In Bussy v. Donaldson,57 the owner of a ship that
sank in a collision brought an action alleging carelessness attributable
49. Purviance v. Angus, 1 U.S. (1 Dal].) 180 (1786) (Pa. Ct. Err. & App.). Until 1806, this
Court was the highest appellate court in the state, sitting over the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Edward A. Hartnett, Not the King's Bench, 20 CONST. COMM. 283, 292 n.30 (2003).
50. Purviance, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 185 (Shippen, J., dissenting) (explaining the basic posture of
the case).
51. Id. (majority opinion).
52. Id. at 186 (Shippen, J., dissenting).
53. (1767) 95 Eng. Rep. 837 (K.B.).
54. Purviance, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 186 (Shippen, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. Id. (summarizing subsequent disposition of the case).
57. 4 U.S. (4 Dal].) 206 (1800). Others have discussed Bussy, including Professors Horwitz
and Schwartz in connection with their debate over whether early eighteenth-century tort liability
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to the owner of the other ship involved in the collision. On the issue
of damages, the defendant, citing Purviance, asked for an instruction
indicating that "the amount of the injury actually sustained, is not the
measure of damages .... "58 In response, Shippen, the judge who had
prompted the court in Purviance to recognize the fact-finder's discre-
tion in setting damages, seemed to backtrack:
As to the assessment of damages: it is a rational, and a legal, prin-
ciple, that the compensation should be equivalent to the injury.
There may be some occasional departures from this principle; but I
think it will be found safest to adhere to it, in all cases proper for a
legal indemnification, in the shape of damages. 59
Concurring in part, Justice Smith could not accede to this statement,
although he too departed from Purviance. In his view, the proper rule
was this:
In a case of contract; or in a case of damage by gross negligence; the
jury should always, I think, give a compensation to the full amount
of the injury actually sustained. But if an injury is done, in a way
merely fortuitous and accidental, I think the jury have a legal and
salutary discretion upon the subject.60
Armed with these instructions, the jury issued a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff for $2,500.61
It is possible to reconcile the opinions in Bussy with the notion of
jury discretion seen in Purviance. (For one thing, some information
provided at the end of the opinion may suggest that the $2,500
awarded by the jury did not actually correspond to the actual loss in-
curred by the owner of the sunken ship.)62 To do so, however, would
require one to read both opinions as using the word "injury" in Black-
stone's sense-to refer to the wronging of the victim, rather than the
loss caused by the wronging. This seems a strained interpretation,
given that both quoted passages are keen to emphasize that, for a cer-
tain class (or certain classes) of cases, there is a relatively precise
was "strict" or fault-based. See Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-
Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1729-30 (1981).
58. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 206.
59. Id. at 207-08. Justice Brackenridge concurred generally with Justice Shippen. Id. at 208.
60. Id. at 208 (Smith, J., concurring in part).
61. Id. (majority opinion).
62. A concluding footnote to the opinion informs us that "the whole expense of raising and
repairing the [sunken ship], amounted to [roughly] £1310." Id. at 208 n.1. In the years
1796-1800, one English pound was worth approximately between $4.13 and $4.55. See Economic
History Services, http://eh.net/hmit/exchangerates/pound.php (last visited Nov. 28, 2005). Using
the mean rate over these six years ($4.39), if the plaintiff were to be fully compensated for its
expenses, it would have had to recover more than twice as much as it did ($5,750), not counting
prejudgment interest. It may be that the jury simply ignored the majority instruction, or that
part of the salvage and repair costs were assigned to persons other than the defendants.
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amount for the jury to award, as opposed to a discretionary decision
to be made. Moreover, both opinions reject the defendant's conten-
tion that the jury should have been instructed that it was free to set its
award at an amount less than the actual amount lost by the plaintiff as
a result of the tort. More likely, the justices meant to articulate varia-
tions on the Blackstonian model that denied jurors the discretion to
take into account the circumstances of a wrong as a basis for awarding
a successful claimant damages in an amount less than the losses he
experienced as a result of the wrong, but still left them with discretion
to award damages in excess of losses if those losses were occasioned
by egregious mistreatment. 63 Supporting this reading is an opinion
issued thirty-six years later, in McBride v. McLaughlin, in which the
justices' successors on the state supreme court articulated a variant on
this rule.64
Suppose, then, that Bussy in fact represents a change of position,
one that marks a step toward the idea of linking tort law with the idea
of making whole. What light might it shed on the explanations for
that move? I would suggest that it offers two clues. The first concerns
the ambiguity of the concept of injury, to which I have already al-
luded. As we have seen, Blackstone used the term to refer to the
wronging of the victim. Thus, when he spoke of tort causes of action
as providing "satisfaction," he had in mind a notion of empowering
victims to retaliate in a particular way. Just as his conception of injury
connoted a "doing onto" the victim by the tortfeasor, his idea of satis-
faction suggested a "doing onto" the tortfeasor by the victim, as op-
posed to some sort of erasure or annulment. By contrast, as the
judges in Bussy seem to use it, the term "injury" refers not to the
wrongful conduct of the defendant, but to the consequences of that
conduct for the plaintiff.65 Likewise, the tort action for damages is not
understood as a response to the wrong, but as a means of obtaining
"indemnification" for the loss.
The ambiguity of the concept of injury was particularly on display in
cases that raised the question of whether the defendant's misconduct
toward the plaintiff had risen to a level that warranted an extra incre-
63. In contrast to Justice Shippen (and Justice Brackenridge), Justice Smith would have per-
mitted jurors to exercise discretion to award less-than-full compensation when liability was pred-
icated on a showing of less-than-gross negligence (i.e., ordinary fault and perhaps strict liability).
Bussy, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) at 208 (Smith, J., concurring in part).
64. McBride v. McLaughlin, 5 Watts 375, 376 (Pa. 1836) (noting that, in a trespass action, the
issue of whether the defendant acted with intent or malice is irrelevant to liability and "even to
the quantum of the damages, in order to bring it below the actual injury," but can provide the
basis for increasing the damages payable by the defendant).
65. Bussy, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) at 207-08.
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ment of damages. (As we saw above, Blackstone recognized the pro-
priety of "exemplary" damages, but did not conceptualize them as a
separate "head" of damages.) For example, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court's 1836 decision in Duncan v. Stalcup 66 involved an action
for trespass to chattels in which the jury awarded damages that the
high court dubbed "vindictive" and "exemplary. '67 The court upheld
the award, rejecting the defendant's argument that the jury was con-
fined to awarding damages up to the value of the lost property. Such
was not the rule, the court reasoned, where there is evidence of mal-
ice, in which case the jury could "award damages in respect of the
malicious conduct of the defendant, and the degree of insult with
which the trespass was committed. '68 Do we see here the Black-
stonian notion that the "injury" to the plaintiff, being a doing rather
than an outcome, includes an assessment of the egregiousness of the
defendant's conduct, so as to warrant redress in the form of a payment
over and above the value of losses caused? Or is the idea here that
exemplary or punitive damages serve a function wholly apart from
redressing the private wrong, such as deterrence or punishment on
behalf of the public? Stalcup seems capable of being read either way.
Again, in noting the ambiguity of the concept of injury, I do not
mean to claim that, until 1800, the term injury always meant one thing
then suddenly meant another. Both meanings were presumably lurk-
ing in the law and in ordinary discourse, which helps explain why the
term supported conflicting usages. Indeed, I would speculate that the
shift from injury as a wronging to injury as a loss reflected in some
cases the substitution of the term as it was used in ordinary discourse
for the legal term of art. I also do not mean to suggest that this lin-
guistic shift, in and of itself, precipitated a new way of thinking about
torts, damages, and law more generally. Rather, I am supposing that
it was one part of a larger set of developments. Still, it does seem
important that during the nineteenth century, lawyers and judges be-
came more inclined to use the term injury to refer to an adverse con-
sequence rather than a wrongdoing.
Second, it is probably significant that Bussy involved a tort claim for
damage to property, as opposed to a claim for bodily injury or for a
dignitary tort such as battery. As we saw above, even on the Black-
stonian view, cases involving claims for property damage caused with-
out intent or malice presented the strongest case for the adoption of a
default rule of damages equal to the value of the victim's losses. This
66. 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 437 (1836).
67. Id. at 437-38.
68. Id. at 438.
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same rule, Blackstone had suggested, should also apply to claims for
breach of contract. In both cases, the idea is intuitive enough. When
it comes to property or promise-based expectancies, one can more
readily suppose that there is a number or a relatively well-defined
range of numbers that corresponds to the loss. There may also be less
reason to suppose that the victim regards the wrongful destruction of
his or her property, or a failure to deliver on a promised performance,
as the sort of affront that demands a form of satisfaction beyond re-
placement. (That is, at least if we are dealing with unintentional dam-
age of property not carrying some special, personal significance.)
With these rationales in mind, it is easy to imagine a court moving
from Blackstone's idea of a default rule for property and contract
cases to the identification of a mandatory rule for them. In fact, there
is no need to imagine. In the 1808 decision of Coffin v. Coffin,69 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court made exactly this move.
There, the court opined that judges are empowered to set aside jury
damage awards in two sets of cases:
[O]ne case is where the law recognizes some fixed rules and princi-
ples in measuring the damages, whence it may be known that there
is an error in the verdict. In this case are included actions on con-
tracts, or for torts done to property, the value of which may be as-
certained by evidence. The other case includes actions for personal
injuries, where no rules are prescribed by law for ascertaining the
damages, but from the exorbitancy of them the Court must con-
clude that the jury acted from passion, partiality, or corruption-
causes which naturally produce error or injustice. 70
And, from a case like Coffin, only one further doctrinal step was re-
quired to reach the full-compensation conception of tort damages. All
it would take is for a court or commentator to miss or gloss over the
fact that Coffin's mandatory rule applied only to a subset of tort cases,
as opposed to all of them.
That the ambiguous concept of injury, particularly when combined
with the idea of a special rule of damages for property torts, had the
potential to give rise to the full compensation conception is vividly on
display in another Massachusetts decision, issued three years after
Coffin. Rockwood v. Allen 7' arose from the second of two litigations.
In the first, Rockwood won a judgment against Patch that resulted in
69. 4 Mass. (I Tyng) 1 (1808).
70. Id. at 9, 43; compare May v. Wright's Adm'rs, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 385, 389 (1809) (sug-
gesting, in keeping with Blackstone, that personal actions for contract breaches are governed by
a default rule of full compensation that can be overridden if there is evidence of malice or intent
on the part of the defendant). For a later New Jersey decision embracing Coffin's approach, see
Berry v. Vreeland, 21 N.J.L. 183 (1847).
71. 5 Mass. (1 Tyng) 254 (1811).
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the attachment of certain chattels belonging to Patch, which were to
be delivered to Rockwood.7 2 Unfortunately for Rockwood, the dep-
uty who was supposed to secure the chattels for him failed to do so, as
a result of which Rockwood lost his claim to them.73 Rockwood then
sued the sheriff (the employer of the careless deputy) in negligence,
and the jury rendered a verdict for Rockwood in an amount equal to
the value of the property that had been attached as a result of the
initial litigation.74 In reviewing this damage award against a challenge
for excessiveness, the Court offered the following:
As to the question, respecting the measure of damages, it is a
general and very sound rule of law, that where an injury has been
sustained, for which the law gives a remedy, that remedy shall be
commensurate to the injury sustained. The damages in this case are
the value of the goods attached, it being understood that such value
did not exceed the amount of the plaintiff's judgment in the suit
upon which they were attached. 75
The phrase "injury sustained" is ambiguous as between the two mean-
ings discussed above. The notion that the plaintiff's remedy "shall be
commensurate" to the injury could mean that it shall be commensu-
rate to the wrong suffered by the plaintiff at the hands of the defen-
dant, or it could mean that it shall be commensurate to the losses
flowing from that wrong. The court's application of its "general rule"
is likewise ambiguous. Does it generate an award for the plaintiff
equal to the value of the property he lost because that measure is the
rule for property damage cases? Or because it is the rule for all tort
cases? Even if the justices in Rockwood meant to endorse a Black-
stonian view, or Bussy's or Coffin's variations on it, a later court could
perhaps be forgiven for reading it to endorse the idea that, in every
tort action, the measure of damages is full compensation.
Starting in the 1830s, one begins to see fairly clear instantiations of
the full compensation view. Again, the Pennsylvania courts shed in-
teresting light here. In 1836, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court de-
cided McBride v. McLaughlin, a trespass action that seems to have
struck the justices as posing a conundrum under the Blackstonian con-
ception of torts and damages, and in doing so, may have induced the
court to break with that conception. 76 The defendants in that case had
by means of an earlier suit illegitimately secured a judgment that ena-
72. Id.
73. Id.
74.. Id. at 255.
75. Id. at 256.
76. McBride v. McLaughlin, 5 Watts 375 (Pa. 1836).
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bled them to seize the property of plaintiff John McLaughlin. 77 It
turned out, however, that they had meant all along to seize property
owned by John's brother James.78 John commenced an action against
them for abuse of process and for recovery of the value of the prop-
erty.79 The question facing the McBride court was whether the aggra-
vating fact of the defendants' malice toward James ought to affect
John's recovery, given that the defendants apparently harbored no
malice toward John.80 Perhaps concerned that a Blackstonian concep-
tion of tort law and damages would warrant a negative answer to that
question, the court drew a sharp distinction between compensatory
and punitive damages, which in turn permitted it to sidestep the prob-
lem of misdirected malice.8 1 That the defendants had behaved so rep-
rehensibly was a matter of public concern, and a ground for
punishment via a private action in the name of the public, "for the
sake of example .... ,,82 The court said: "There are offences against





81. Id. at 376 (suggesting that the failure to award damages in vindication of the public aspect
of the defendants' wrong would permit them to get off too lightly).
Such a worry was understandable, but probably unfounded. Suppose that, out of spite toward
his neighbor N, A poisons and kills a pet dog that he mistakenly believes to be N's, but that is in
fact V's. It is true that A has acted differently toward V than toward N-his action was
prompted by a desire to inflict misery on N, not V. In this sense, A has committed a different
sort of wrong against V than he would have committed against N had he been correct in suppos-
ing the dog was N's. Still, even though V would not be able to argue that A acted with malice
toward him, he could still argue that the intentional killing of his dog for no reason other than
malice toward another is sufficiently heinous misconduct as to him (and anyone else who might
prove to be the owner of the dog) as to warrant an extra increment of damages.
In this respect, V's claim would resemble the sort of claim that often gets handled under the
rubric of "transferred intent." Suppose X and Y get into a heated argument on the sidewalk of a
residential street. X pulls out a gun, at which point Y flees. X shoots at Y as he is running away,
but ends up hitting innocent bystander B, whom X had no intent to shoot. Although courts
might treat this is as a "transferred intent" battery of B by X, it is less fictionally described as an
instance of negligence toward B that happens to be accompanied by the sort of recklessness
toward the victim that would warrant an award of punitive damages. B's cause of action would
thus sound in negligence, because the gist of his complaint is that X's shooting in a residential
neighborhood, even if intentional as to Y, was careless as to the physical well-being of persons
such as B. But, because of the extreme dangerousness of the activity for anyone near to the
scene of the argument, as well as X's utter lack of justification for inflicting that danger on such
persons, B can ask for punitive damages on the ground that X acted with reckless indifference
toward the well-being of persons such as him.
Analogously, McBride could claim that the defendants' scheme for the theft of his brother's
property was sufficiently risky to other owners whose property they might mistakenly take, and
so completely unjustified in imposing that risk on them, as to count as the sort of "aggravated"
wrong against McBride that warranted a jury award of greater-than-make-whole damages.
82. McBride, 5 Watts at 377.
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which would pass without reprehension, did not the providence of the
courts permit the private remedy to become an instrument of public
correction. ' 83 Here we see an early instantiation of the modern idea
that tort damages come in two forms-compensatory damages that
indemnify the victim for his or her losses, and punitive damages that
have no compensatory function, and instead serve the public goals of
punishment and deterrence.
McBride's recasting of tort damages in terms of a categorical divi-
sion between compensatory and punitive damages would soon be so-
lidified in Pennsylvania and elsewhere. In 1843, the circuit court in
Bishop v. Stockton offered the following instruction to a jury faced
with a suit by a passenger against a common carrier:
If the defendants [are found liable], then the enquiry will be what
amount of damages shall be given? Shall they be compensatory or
exemplary? Compensatory damages are given to restore or make
whole again, or make reparation for loss, injury, or suffering, past
and future.... But further vindictive or exemplary damages may be
given to indemnify the public for past injuries and damages, and to
protect the community from future risks and wrongs.84
Insofar as Bishop's invocation of "make whole" can be taken as repre-
sentative of Pennsylvania usage, it suggests that the state's law con-
cerning tort damages had evolved markedly since 1806, when
Purviance was decided.8 5
B. Full Compensation, Fair Compensation, and Punitive Damages
Bishop's drawing of a sharp distinction between compensatory
damages (indemnification) and punitive damages (punishment) would
83. Id. at 376.
84. 3 F. Cas. 453, 454-55 (Pa. Cir. Ct. 1843).
85. This is not to say that other states' law followed the same path as Pennsylvania's. For
example, in Bateman v. Goodyear, 12 Conn. 575 (1838), the Connecticut Supreme Court of Er-
rors stated that a plaintiff suing for a trespass to land "is to be indemnified, for what he has
actually suffered," but then proceeded to make clear that this would require
all those circumstances, which give character to the transaction ... to be weighed and
considered. Thus, whether the entry was violent or quiet, whether through malice or
mistake, whether under colour of right, or without any pretence of title, are all proper
subjects of consideration. And if a person, acting without pretence of right, would be
subject to greater damages than one acting under a bona fide claim of title, surely such
claim, accompanied by proof of actual title, should be submitted to the triers. For in-
stance, if a tenant at sufferance was holding over, and the lessor ejected him by force,
under an execution, which was technically defective, ought that man to recover the
same damages as if he had been dispossessed, in the night season, by an armed ruffian,
whose object was plunder?
Id. at 575 (internal citations omitted).
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soon be enshrined in Theodore Sedgwick's influential 1847 treatise on
damages. According to Sedgwick,
[I]n all cases of civil injury, or breach of contract, with the exception
of those cases of trespasses or torts, accompanied by oppression,
fraud, malice, or negligence so gross as to raise a presumption of
malice, where the jury have a discretion to award exemplary or vin-
dictive damages; in all other cases the declared object is to give
compensation to the party injured for the actual loss sustained.86
Here, unmistakably, we see a full-blown rendition of the modern, full-
compensation conception of tort damages. 87
As is now well known, some of Sedgwick's key claims-in particular
his claim about the propriety of awarding punitive damages in tort
cases-were immediately contested by Simon Greenleaf in the second
edition of his treatise on evidence. 8 What is less understood are the
precise terms on which Greenleaf objected. The Sedgwick-Greenleaf
fight is typically cast as presupposing the full compensation conception
of tort damages, with Greenleaf insisting that tort plaintiffs cannot get
anything more than indemnification for their losses, and Sedgwick in-
sisting that they can in addition recover punitive damages to serve the
public goals of punishment and deterrence.8 9 This interpretation of
Greenleaf's side of the debate is understandable. As is discussed
briefly below, his manner of using the troublesome term "injury"l at
times invites it. Still, close inspection reveals that he instead advo-
cated a variant on the Blackstonian idea that the nature of the defen-
dant's mistreatment of the victim affects the severity of the victim's
"injury" and therefore the compensation to which the latter is
entitled.
The standard view of Greenleaf's position seems amply supported
by his opening remarks on the law of evidence as it pertains to dam-
ages, which emphasize damages' compensatory role and the precision
86. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 26-27 (1st ed. 1847)
(internal citations omitted), available at Gale.com, The Making of Modern Law: Legal Treatises
1800-1926, http://www.gale.com/ModernLaw. Note that it is not quite right to attribute the full
compensation conception to Sedgwick, who bemoaned the fact that, given the American rule on
attorney's fees, as well as the uncompensated hassles associated with litigation, a plaintiff could
never expect truly to obtain "full" compensation. Id. at 37-38.
87. For an earlier appearance, see Randel v. President, Dirs. & Chesapeake & Del. Canal, 1
Del. (1 Harr.) 233, 316 (Del. Super. Ct. 1833) (providing a transcript of trial-level proceedings,
which include an instruction to the jury stating that "[t~he only guide that the court can give you
on [the subject of damages] is the legal rule, that whatever loss or damage naturally and immedi-
ately results from the wrong complained of, the wrong-doer is bound to compensate").
88. 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253, at 242 n.2 (2d ed.
1848). On the dispute, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860, at 82--83 (1977).
89. HORWITZ, supra note 88, at 82-85.
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with which they ought to be calculated: "Damages are given as a com-
pensation, recompense, or satisfaction to the plaintiff, for an injury
actually received by him, from the defendant. They should be pre-
cisely commensurate with the injury, neither more, nor less; and this,
whether it be to his person or estate." 90 Yet the remainder of the
discussion of evidence pertaining to damages makes clear that Green-
leaf did not treat the concept of "injury" as limited to the victim's
losses caused by commission of the tort-that is, at least if by losses
one has in mind lost income, bodily harm, pain and suffering, humilia-
tion, and the like. This much is clear in his claim that evidence of a
defendant's malice, or his intention to defraud, is relevant to the jury's
assessment of the victim's injury: "where an evil intent has manifested
itself in acts and circumstances, accompanying the principal transac-
tion, they constitute part of the injury, and, if properly alleged may be
proved, like any other facts material to the issue." 91 Likewise, al-
though he denied the relevance to damages of evidence of the wrong-
doer's ability to pay, he allowed that wealth evidence can be admitted
to establish the defendant's "rank and influence in society, and there-
fore the extent of the injury"-the notion being that it is worse for a
victim to suffer a wrong involving abuse of power than it is to suffer a
comparable wrong lacking that dimension. 92 On the flip-side issue of
mitigation, he noted that, in certain actions, evidence of "the extreme
youth, or partial insanity of the defendant, may be shown to convince
the Jury, that the plaintiff suffered but little injury."'93 It is difficult to
see how the foregoing considerations-which all concern characteris-
tics of the tortfeasor or his actions toward the victim-have any bear-
ing on a damages calculation that is concerned exclusively to assess
losses suffered by the plaintiff as a consequence of the tortfeasor's
misconduct.
And yet what makes Greenleaf most prone to being misread as a
full-compensation theorist is that he sometimes did seem to reduce
Blackstone's active notion of injury-as-victimization to an "end-state"
description of the condition in which the victim finds himself when the
90. GREENLEAF, supra note 88, § 253, at 242 (internal citations omitted). Greenleaf later
makes clear that he, like Blackstone, recognizes that personal injury tort claims often generate
claims for damages that do not admit of precise specification, and instead must be determined by
an exercise of jury discretion. Id. § 255, at 257.
91. Id. § 272, at 285 (emphases omitted and added); see also id. § 266, at 271 (in actions ex
delicto, evidence can be admitted in aggravation or mitigation of the injury itself).
92. Id. § 269, at 274 (internal citations omitted).
93. Id. § 275, at 282.
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dust has settled.94 In one instance, for example, he says that jurors in
a libel case may.rightly consider evidence concerning the gravity of
the defendant's misconduct toward the victim because it bears on the
"degree of injury to the plaintiff, either in his feelings, or in his charac-
ter .... -95 The last clause, at least, suggests an inclination to reduce
the concept of injury to a notion of adverse consequences of the sort
expressed in the full compensation view, and hence possible support
for the idea that Greenleaf conceived of damages in terms of what
happened to the victim as a consequence of the defendant's wrong,
apart from the wronging itself. Again, however, appearances are mis-
leading. For although Greenleaf at times invoked the term "injury" to
refer to the consequences or losses suffered by the victim, he only did
so because he adopted a very capacious notion of what can count as a
consequence or loss. In particular, he was prepared to treat the fact of
having been badly mistreated as part of the "loss" caused to the victim
by the tortfeasor. Thus, in discussing a case of forcible trespass,
Greenleaf first explained that "[t]he party is to be indemnified for
what he has actually suffered. ' 96 By itself, this passage reads as if it
endorses the full compensation conception of tort damages. Yet the
passage in its entirety reads as follows: "[t]he party is to be indemni-
fied for what he has actually suffered; and then all those circum-
stances, which give character to the transaction, are to be weighed and
considered. ' 97 In other words, damages should correspond in part to
the nature of the mistreatment (the "character" of the "transaction"),
but only because the relative wrongfulness of the mistreatment can be
fully captured as part of a description of the post-tort condition of the
victim (rather than as part of a description of what the tortfeasor did
to the victim).
94. Greenleaf also generated confusion by occasionally conflating issues of liability and dam-
ages. For example, he at one point asserted that, for actions brought under the writ of trespass vi
et armis, evidence of the defendant's "secret intention" is "wholly immaterial." What he meant
by this was that a plaintiff does not have to prove intent to make out a prima facie case of
trespass so as to earn an entitlement to at least "some" damages. GREENLEAF, supra note 88,
§ 270, at 274-75; see also id. § 267, at 271-72 (conflating the issue of when damages should
include compensation for emotional distress with the issue of when "pure" emotional distress
will support a cause of action). Elsewhere he observed that damages in an action for trespass on
the case are measured by the loss suffered by the victim, regardless of whether the defendant
acted intentionally or carelessly. Id. § 266, at 271. Here I think he meant to emphasize that the
plaintiff's "injury" (understood in the broad sense discussed in the text) is always the touchstone
for determining damages, and hence the fact that a tortious act has been intentionally done does
not of itself tell us that the victim has suffered a worse form of mistreatment at the hands of the
wrongdoer.
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In short, it is anachronistic to read Greenleaf as a make-whole pur-
ist. He adamantly rejected Sedgwick's claim that English and Ameri-
can case law supported recognition of a separate head of damages,
called exemplary or punitive damages, by which juries could go be-
yond providing redress to the victim for the wrong done to him so as
to punish the wrongdoer on behalf of society. But, in doing so, he
took the position that the character of the defendant's mistreatment
of the victim ought to help determine the measure of damages, in that
egregious forms of mistreatment amounted to "aggravation of the in-
jury itself which the plaintiff had received. ' 98 Rightly read, his work
thus attests to the continued vitality into the mid-nineteenth century
of the Blackstonian conception of tort as a law of wrongs and redress,
which in turn gives rise to a damages rule of fair, rather than full,
compensation.
Was Greenleaf right about his reading of the older English cases on
punitive damages? Yes and no. The most famous of these, of course,
was Huckle v. Money. 99 In Huckle, royal agents acting on a general
warrant seized and briefly detained, under pleasant conditions, a
printer employed by a newspaper that had been critical of the govern-
ment. 100 Despite the lack of physical or psychological harm to the
plaintiff, the jury awarded him £300 in his action for battery and false
imprisonment. 101 The King's Bench refused to reduce the award. 10 2
Lord Chief Justice Pratt conceded that "the personal injury done to
[the plaintiff] was very small, so that if the jury had been confined by
their oath to consider the mere personal injury only, perhaps [£20]
damages would have been thought damages sufficient .... o103 But
the court also said:
[Tihe small injury done to the plaintiff, or the inconsiderableness of
his station and rank in life did not appear to the jury in that striking
light in which the great point of law touching the liberty of the sub-
ject appeared to them at the trial; they saw a magistrate over all the
King's subjects, exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna Charta,
and attempting to destroy the liberty of the kingdom, by insisting
upon the legality of this general warrant before them; they heard
the King's Counsel, and saw the solicitor of the Treasury endeavour-
ing to support and maintain the legality of the warrant in a tyranni-
cal and severe manner. These are the ideas which struck the jury on
98. GREENLEAF, supra note 88, § 253, at 250 n.2 (emphasis added).




103. Id. at 768-69.
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the trial; and I think they have done right in giving exemplary
damages.10 4
Although this language is not free from ambiguity, I think Green-
leaf was right to argue that Huckle is not best read as creating a sepa-
rate category of "exemplary" or "punitive" damages that stands apart
from the category of "compensatory" or "make-whole" damages. In-
stead it suggests (in keeping with Blackstone) that the jury ought to
set damages at an amount that will constitute a satisfaction or vindica-
tion of the plaintiff's rights, which in turn requires them to adjust their
damages award in light of their assessment of the nature of the wrong
committed by the defendant against the plaintiff. On this interpreta-
tion, the court's reference to the £20 award that might otherwise have
been appropriate does not refer to the amount that would have in-
demnified the victim for the welfare or utility he lost (such that the
remaining £280 would then be seen as serving the separate purpose of
"punishing" the defendant). 10 5 Rather, the point is that the jury was
entitled to find that this particular act of battery and false imprison-
ment constituted a wronging of the victim different in kind from oth-
erwise similar wrongs committed by private actors. The difference
resides not only in the fact that it was the government agents who
seized and confined the victim, but also in the fact that the govern-
ment's representatives maintained, both when they seized the plaintiff
and at trial, that they were entitled to act in this manner toward the
victim. Given this evidence, the jury was justified in assessing the
large award it did because it was warranted in seeing something more
in the case than a brief and relatively harmless confinement of one
man by another. Instead, what "appeared to them at the trial" was a
wrong committed against a private citizen by agents of an entity that
enjoyed a unique claim of authority to exercise power over citizens,
and that had explicitly disavowed well-established limits on that au-
thority. 10 6 In other words, the jury acted appropriately "in giving ex-
104. Id. at 769.
105. Notice in this regard that the court deems the plaintiff's low social status as a ground for
reducing his award that stands independently of the magnitude of the "injury" done to him. It is
hard to see how the use of status as a separate criterion fits with a notion of compensatory
damages keyed only to the losses suffered by the plaintiff.
106. To appreciate this point, imagine an ordinary action for battery by the victim of a physi-
cal attack. Now suppose that, when questioned at trial as to his reasons for attacking the victim,
the attacker blithely asserted that he was in all ways a superior person to the lowly victim, such
that he enjoyed a right to beat him with impunity. Presumably a jury armed with this informa-
tion would be entitled to treat this attacker's behavior as a worse manner of treating the victim
than a comparable attack lacking this dimension of arrogance toward the victim. Two centuries
later, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the especially problematic nature of physical seizures
by persons claiming the authority of government as a ground for rejecting the idea that Fourth
[Vol. 55:435
TWO CONCEPTIONS OF TORT DAMAGES
emplary damages" because a relatively large award accurately
reflected the enormity of the wrong that the victim had suffered at the
hands of his government captors.
So Greenleaf was on the right track, in my view, in suggesting that
Sedgwick had misread Huckle and some other early, punitive damage
cases. Sedgwick was not totally off base, however, for another promi-
nent opinion by the same judge who wrote the opinion in Huckle
seems to embrace a Blackstonian, fair-compensation conception of
tort damages while also identifying punitive damages as a separate
head of damages. This hybrid position might at first blush seem hard
to sustain. After all, as we have seen, under the fair compensation
view, the egregious nature of the defendant's misconduct is already
supposed to be accounted for in the jury's award of fair compensation.
If so, what is left for punitive damages to do? The answer is familiar:
they serve to vindicate the interests of the public, rather than the vic-
tim, by making an example of the defendant so as to reinforce norms
of appropriate behavior and to deter such conduct in the future. This,
I take it, is the position staked out by Lord Chief Justice Pratt in
Wilkes v. Wood, the famous companion case to Huckle:
[A] jury have it in their power to give damages for more than the
injury received. Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to
the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to
deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as proof of the
detestation of the jury to the action itself.107
In sum, Wilkes offers a (perhaps unstable) mixture made up of the
wrongs-and-redress model of tort (tort as private wrong; injury as
wrongdoing), the fair compensation conception of damages (damages
as satisfaction), and a public-law conception of punitive damages. 10 8
Amendment rights are adequately vindicated by state-law trespass and false imprisonment
claims. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 391-92 (1971) (recognizing a distinct
constitutional tort action for victims of such misconduct).
107. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (K.B.).
108. It may helpful to chart the various positions I identify here in a simple matrix. None of
the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century lawyers or scholars in my small sample seem to have
occupied the lower-left quadrant (i.e., the position that tort compensation ought to be full com-
pensation but that there ought not to be punitive damages). I therefore attribute that position to
"Greenleaf misread," by which I refer to the modern miscasting of Greenleaf discussed in the
text. Of course, numerous jurists and scholars have since advocated it.
Fair Compensation, No Separate Fair Compensation, Separate
Punitives Punitives
(Blackstone, Greenleaf) (L.C.J. Pratt in Wilkes)





To say the same thing, Wilkes supposes that tort law both empowers
the victim to seek redress for conduct amounting to a wrong to him or
her, and the jury to police and make examples of particularly antiso-
cial behavior on behalf of all of us.
IV. MAKING WHOLE, TORT LAW, AND TORT THEORY
The foregoing has examined some caselaw and treatises for clues
about how the full compensation conception of tort damages emerged
in the early nineteenth century. The story it tells is an "internal" one,
operating entirely at the level of lawyerly usage and doctrine. In of-
fering such an account, I do not mean to suggest that it is complete, or
that conceptual and doctrinal shifts within law happen independently
of other changes. (I have not yet found connections between the par-
ticular development I have described and other important contempo-
raneous developments, such as the breakdown of the writ system and
the accompanying emergence of the tort of negligence.) Why at this
time would the concept of injury drift away from the idea of a wrong-
ing and toward the idea of a loss? And why would a default rule of
damages for property cases spread to tort cases generally? I have
suggested that a certain conceptual sloppiness was at work, but why
did the sloppiness point in one direction? On quick inspection, the
movement in the understanding of "injury" from wrongful mistreat-
ment to adverse consequence, and the generalization from property
cases to all tort cases, seem to share a couple of characteristics. First,
both may reflect an increasing judicial and lawyerly inclination to
think of law in observable and quantifiable terms. The idea of a
wrongful mistreatment is normative and elusive. The idea of a loss
seems more tangible. Likewise, the emergence of a hard-and-fast rule
for property damage, as we have seen, was explicitly defended on the
ground that property losses admit of relatively precise valuations.
Both trends are thus consistent with an inclination to render law in
terms more empirical, less overtly normative, and (in principle) more
certain.
Relatedly, there is probably at work a concern to assert greater ju-
dicial control over juries. The Blackstonian depiction does not com-
pletely cede the job of awarding damages to juries. Still, for judges
who are looking to control juries, it helps to be able to point to legal
rules and harder-edged concepts like "amount of loss" instead of be-
ing left to second-guess the jury for having grossly misapprehended
the nature of the wrong done by the tortfeasor to the victim. Interest-
ingly, although the idea of a trend toward increasing judicial control
over juries in the nineteenth century is (thanks to Morton Horwitz,
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among others) a familiar one among legal historians,10 9 these tort
cases-which by and large seem not to have involved commercial in-
terests-suggest that this development may have been fueled less by
the demands of business for greater predictability in awards than by
an inclination among judges to place the law on a (supposedly) more
solid and certain basis.
Regardless of the explanation, it seems that the idea of full compen-
sation flowered in the mid-eighteenth century. Still, it would take
some time before this doctrinal development was integrated into an
overall theory of tort law. The roots of this broader and deeper shift
are traceable, I think, to a jurisprudential development running from
Bentham through Austin to Holmes, in which analyses of law shifted
their focus away from rights and wrongs to remedies and sanctions.
Here, I can only nod to the theoretical development I have in mind by
briefly canvassing some of the basic features of Austin's and Holmes's
views on torts.
As we have seen, Blackstone's conception of tort compensation as
fair compensation was connected to a theory of torts that was rights-
and wrongs-driven. In this picture, the basic rights of the individual
(e.g., to bodily integrity) give rise to a right to retaliate against wrong-
doers for actions that constitute wrongings of the victim, which in turn
gives rise to a legal power to sue the wrongdoer that generates a claim
to fair compensation. In his lectures on jurisprudence, Austin turned
this framework on its head.110 Rather than reasoning from the nature
of the duty to the appropriate mode of remedy, he reasoned from the
real party in interest-the person or entity on whose behalf the law
authorized suit-to the category of wrong that had been committed.
In his view, it is only when the sovereign enacts laws that authorize
persons to bring private suits in response to others' actions that the
Blackstonian category of private wrongs-and the rights and "rela-
tive" duties underlying them-come into existence. (Likewise, it is
only insofar as the sovereign authorizes sanctions at the behest of gov-
ernment officials that one can identify nonrelative or "absolute"
duties.)
Austin's top-down, remedy-driven conception of torts went hand in
hand with a reconceptualization of the purpose of tort actions. He
conceded to Blackstone that the immediate purpose of a tort suit was
to empower the victim to obtain redress. But, he supposed, this does
not tell us all that much. For once we recognize that torts exist only
109. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 88, at 28-29.




because of the sovereign's decision to arm people with the power to
sue others, we will want to inquire why a sovereign would make that
decision. The answer, Austin supposed, was to be found in the sover-
eign's interest in deterring people from engaging in wrongful conduct.
The "paramount" point of a private right of action, he concluded,
"like that of a criminal sanction[,] is the prevention of offenses
generally."'11
In the 1870s, Holmes would link Austin's inversion of Blackstonian
thinking to full compensation. Following Austin, Holmes supposed
that tort law was about duties imposed and enforced by the sovereign
as against its subjects through the courts. 112 Unlike either Blackstone
or Austin, however, Holmes supposed that the imposition of sanctions
through private suits had nothing to do with breaches of "relative" or
"relational" duties owed by one person to others, and indeed nothing
whatsoever to do with wrongs.113 Indeed, Holmes criticized Austin
for being insufficiently positivistic and overly moralistic in supposing
that modern law would be interested in what he took to be the some-
what childish and barbaric practices of blaming, retaliating, and pun-
ishing on the basis of wrongdoing.114 Thus, the key move in The
Common Law is its claim that late nineteenth-century criminal law
and tort law had identified the same rule of conduct as the trigger for
sanction and liability, namely the rule that attaches adverse legal con-
sequences to unreasonable acts undertaken by actors in a position to
foresee that their conduct might cause harm to another. 1 5 That both
criminal and tort law deployed an "objective" standard of reasonable-
ness-one that did not track notions of moral blame 116-confirmed
for Holmes that the state's reasons for issuing sanctions had nothing
to do with the wrongfulness of a citizen's acts. Instead, the modern,
liberal state was now setting a standard of conduct for another pur-
pose-that of giving each person enough room in which to act, as well
as relatively clear notice as to the point at which that room would run
out, thus exposing the actor to adverse legal consequences.11 7 This in
turn would permit people (with the help of their lawyers) to order
111. Id. § 722, at 360.
112. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 1733, 1756 (1998) (discussing Holmes's conception of duties).
113. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 144 (38th prtg. 1945) (1881).
Holmes stated: "[Tihe general purpose of the law of torts is to secure a man indemnity against
certain forms of harm to person, reputation, or estate, at the hands of his neighbors, not because
they are wrong, but because they are harms." Id. at 149.
114. Id. at 81-82.
115. Id. at 53.
116. Id. at 107-09.
117. Id. at 79.
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their affairs and make rational decisions about how to go about their
lives.
But if, in Holmes's view, criminal and tort law were concerned with
setting the same standard of conduct, what was the point of differenti-
ating between them? Austin, following Blackstone, had an easy an-
swer to that question, one that focused on the identity of the party
seeking to have sanctions imposed on the defendant (private citizen or
government). That option, however, was not available to Holmes, be-
cause he rejected the idea that there was a distinction to be drawn
between "relational" and "absolute" duties." 8 So instead he focused
on the nature of the consequence that the state had attached to unrea-
sonable conduct in these two classes of legal proceedings. In criminal
cases, judges ordered fines and imprisonments out of a Benthamite
and Austinian concern for "prevention"-albeit prevention of harms,
not wrongs. 1 9 In tort cases, the government, through its courts, or-
dered actors who had exceeded the bounds of liberty set by law to
assume losses incurred by others as a result of their unreasonable con-
duct. In short, what made tort law a department of the law in its own
right was that it attached to violations of the state's code of conduct
the particular consequence that the violator would have to indemnify
others for any adverse consequences caused by the violation: "The
business of the law of torts is to fix the dividing line between those
cases in which a man is liable for harm which he has done, and those
in which he is not."'120 Tort is a unique branch of the law because it is
uniquely a law of indemnification; a law that enforces standards of
conduct by holding actors who violate those standards responsible to
pay for the losses that those violations have caused.12'
With Holmes, then, one sees the idea of full compensation inte-
grated into a theoretically self-conscious account of torts, one that has
been in the ascendancy in the academy ever since. Still, to observe
this important development is hardly to concede the field of play to
the full compensation conception of damages or to theories of tort
inspired by Holmes. Indeed, the issue remains very much alive, in
part because the tendency to treat making whole as part of the essence
of tort continues to raise serious problems and confusions. To take an
118. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 112, at 1756.
119. HOLMES, supra note 113, at 46.
120. Id. at 79; see also id. at 96, 144.
121. It is possible that, by making tortfeasors indemnify victims, the state would reduce the
incidence of tortious conduct. But Holmes did not offer or develop a deterrence-based theory of
tort. Rather, he treated it as a system for allocating losses as between an innocent victim and an
actor who had taken more than his fair share of liberty (where "fairness" was determined by the
standards of conduct set out by judicial decisions in negligence cases).
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obvious example (to which I have already alluded), consider the insti-
tution of punitive damages. On the full compensation conception, pu-
nitive damages must be regarded as a bizarre vestige of tort's criminal-
law roots, or a gerry-rigged device for achieving public-law goals such
as deterrence. By contrast, if making whole is not the be-all and end-
all of tort law, then there is nothing necessarily odd (or un-tort-like) in
courts sometimes recognizing claims to "exemplary" redress for cer-
tain forms of wrongdoing.1 22 Moreover, the fair compensation model
promises a more coherent framework by which to assess the propriety
of punitive awards than do deterrence and punishment models. 123
This same theoretical decoupling of substantive and remedial law
could also explain why a fact-finder might be entitled to award less-
than-fully compensatory damages, even to a not-at-fault tort plaintiff.
Given the prevailing make-whole conception of tort, whenever jurors
informally adjust damage awards downward from that target to reflect
what they take to be the equities of a given case, their actions must be
portrayed as a subtle form of nullification. The alternative,
"decoupled" conception stands to put a more positive light on this sort
of adjustment. Consider in this regard the eggshell skull rule. Under
the full compensation approach, this rule is treated as a corollary to
the make-whole principle. It therefore is presented as an entitlement
on the part of the plaintiff. But, within a conception of tort that
122. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105 (2005)
(providing a conception of punitive damages within a wrongs-and-redress conception of tort
law); see also Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as
Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 615-16 (2003) (observing that
punitive damages were in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries often deemed owed to the
victims of wrongs that added insult to the victim's injury); John C. P. Goldberg, Tort Law for
Federalists (and the Rest of Us): Private Law in Disguise, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 3, 7-10
(2004). While Colby's excellent article rightly emphasizes that many cases in which large dam-
ages were awarded involved wrongs that included a component of insult, his analysis demon-
strates the pitfalls of reading old cases armed with the "presentist" supposition that seventeenth
and early-eighteenth century judges had already settled on the make-whole conception of dam-
ages. Thus, one of the English cases he cites as an early punitive damages case appears instead
to express the Blackstonian view that damages for insult on top of injury do not fall under some
separate head of damages, but instead form a component of the unitary notion of compensation
commensurate to "the value of [the] injury done to [the victim]." Colby, supra, at 615 (quoting
Leith v. Pope, 96 Eng. Rep. 777, 778 (C.P. 1779)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In another
instance, Colby goes so far as to insert the adjective "punitive" into a judicial opinion, thereby
converting an expression of the fair compensation conception to a modem notion of damages as
dividing up into compensatory and punitive damages. See id. ("Along similar lines, the courts
explained that 'the circumstances of time and place, when and where the insult is given, require
different [punitive] damages; as it is greater insult to be beaten upon the Royal Exchange, than
in a private room."') (quoting Tullidge v. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep. 909, 910 (C.P. 1769)).
123. 1 am not suggesting that decoupling tort from the idea of making whole logically entails
that punitive damages be made available in tort cases. Rather, it removes a facial objection to
punitive damages as an anomaly.
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decouples substantive and remedial law, it can be given an alternative
and perhaps more intuitive characterization as a permissive rule of
damages. So construed, the eggshell skull rule would stand for a re-
jection of the idea that certain defendants-namely, those who are
subject to liability for losses that result in part from a victim's hidden
vulnerability-are entitled to have that liability capped at the amount
of harm that a reasonable person in their position could have fore-
seen. It would not be understood to generate a positive entitlement in
the thin-skulled plaintiff to compensation for all of her losses. In-
stead, it would leave the fact-finder discretion to determine whether,
given all the facts of the case, it is fair or reasonable to compensate the
plaintiff for some or all of the unforeseeable quantum of harm he or
she suffered.124
More broadly, as I have already suggested in this Part, detaching
the idea of tort from the idea of making whole may have important
implications for tort theory. I will conclude by mentioning two. His-
torians and historically inclined scholars including Lawrence Fried-
man and Thomas Grey have claimed that there really was no tort law
until the mid- to late nineteenth century.1 25 In their minds, this "fact"
defeats any claim that tort law is deeply rooted in our legal traditions.
And when this historical claim is combined with a policy-based con-
demnation of tort as an inefficient system of insurance or deterrence,
the argument for abolishing tort in favor of alternative regulatory and
insurance schemes is complete. 126 The present analysis may suggest
that what they describe as an absence of tort law is more accurately
described as an absence of a particular theory of tort law, by which
tort is viewed as providing make-whole compensation to those injured
by others' unreasonable conduct. In turn, this may provide the basis
for a riposte both to the claim that tort law is a recent innovation and
the claim that tort law is nothing more than a lousy system of insur-
ance and deterrence. Conceived of as a law of private wrongs, tort
law can claim an impressive lineage, and can be seen to make a good
deal more sense than critics have supposed.12 7
124. An appreciation of the fair compensation view may also help make sense of, and perhaps
might even justify, the apparent willingness of nineteenth-century jurors (with at least the tacit
blessing of the judges who upheld their awards) to adjust tort damages in light of the where-
withal of the defendant. PETER KARSTEN, HEART V. HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 264-75 (1997).
125. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467 (2d ed. 1985); Thomas C.
Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1230-32 (2001).
126. See generally STEPHEN SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989)
(offering these critiques, among others).
127. See generally Goldberg, supra note 7 (exploring the roots and continued intelligibility
and value of a redress-based conception of tort law).
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Finally, since the 1970s it has been standard in academic discussions
of tort-and many other branches of law-to divide the world of tort
theory into justice-based theories on the one hand and welfarist or
utilitarian theories on the other. The issue of whether making whole
has something essential to do with tort reveals a different axis along
which to bisect the field. On one side are theories that, by linking tort
law tightly to making whole, treat tort law as a law of loss-shifting-as
specifying the circumstances under which government, at the behest
of a claimant, may order another to pick up a "tab" that the claimant
is presently facing.128 On the other side are theories that view tort law
as a law of wrongs and redress; one that obligates actors to avoid (or
refrain from) causing certain types of injuries to certain others and
that, in the event those obligations are breached, empowers the bene-
ficiaries of those obligations to invoke the legal system to obtain re-
dress as against the breaching party. Although on a wrongs-and-
redress view, a make-whole damages payment might constitute appro-
priate redress in a range of cases, that determination is one of rem-
edy-it is, as we have seen, not built into the very definition of a tort
claim. In this way, we can see that debates about the proper concep-
tualization of tort damages plug into, and help define, ongoing large-
scale disputes in tort theory.
128. The treatment of tort as a law of loss-shifting may be common not only to the work of
(supposedly) "pluralistic" or "pragmatic" scholars such as Rabin and Dobbs, but also to more
overtly theoretical works of corrective justice theory. For example, Jules Coleman's more re-
cent work has tended to argue that tort law achieves corrective justice by virtue of redistributing
losses that unjustly reside with victims to wrongdoers who have rendered themselves deserving
of bearing the loss. Jules L. Coleman, Second Thoughts and Other First Impressions, in ANALYZ-
ING LAW 257, 302 (Brian Bix ed., 1998).
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